Determinism and Free Will
(A Systematic Categorization of Concepts and Theories)


Introduction

Discussions on the topic of determinism and free will are often greatly complicated by ambiguous or inconsistent use of terminology. There are many logically distinct concepts that can at least arguably be classified under the categories of determinism and free will, and many different theories about which of these various concepts are true and how they relate to the moral significance of our choices. These concepts and theories have unfortunately acquired various names over the years which are seldom related in a systematic way, and often used differently by different people.

The following is my attempt to help clear up this confusion by categorizing the concepts and theories in a logical, hierarchical fashion. I have tried to identify the most commonly-used terms I could find for each category, but in some cases this was a rather subjective exercise. The reader is therefore warned that some authors use some of these terms differently from how I have defined them, and that in a few cases I have even had to invent the terms myself. (These cases are labeled as “nonstandard terminology” in my categorization below.)

My purpose here is only to clarify the terminology for philosophical and/or theological discussions about determinism and free will, not to defend any particular point of view. I do not think my own view on the subject has unfairly biased my arrangement and discussion of the categories and terms, but in the interest of full disclosure I will acknowledge up front that I am personally a compatibilist, as defined below.


Concepts of Determinism and Free Will

Root Category: Determinism

Definition:
Determinism is the idea that the entire future of the universe, including the future choices (and therefore actions) of human beings, will come about necessarily. This means that whatever will happen is inevitable—there is no chance that it might not happen.
Discussion:
There are various conceptions as to the nature of the necessity or inevitability of the future in determinism, which is the reason for the two general subcategories below. Many people focus only on the first subcategory (causal determinism), and may not even consider the second subcategory (logical determinism) to be a true species of determinism at all. I think it is more logical and less confusing to include both of these subcategories, however, so long as we are careful to recognize that when many people speak of determinism they are specifically referring only to the first subcategory (causal determinism).
Subcategories:

1) Causal Determinism

Definition:
Causal determinism is the idea that the entire future of the universe, including the future choices of human beings, is inevitable in that it is necessitated by a complete causal connection to the past.
Discussion:
Causal determinism implies that the ultimate cause of every future event already exists. In other words, there can be no uncaused or self-caused events. (Not since the origin of the universe, at least—we leave aside the question of the cause of the universe itself for the purpose of this analysis.)
Subcategories:

1a) Physical Determinism (a.k.a. Scientific Determinism or Nomological Determinism or Laplacian Determinism)

Definition:
Physical determinism is the idea that the entire future of the universe, including the future choices of human beings, is causally determined by the current state of the universe evolving in time via strict accordance with the laws of physics.
Discussion:
This is probably the most commonly discussed variety of determinism, and it is what many philosophers and other people mean when they simply use the word determinism by itself. It was most famously advocated by Pierre-Simon Laplace in the early 1800s, and was generally held to be implied by science until the discovery of quantum mechanics in the early 1900s. Most current interpretations of quantum mechanics imply that physical determinism is false, however. (Although some interpretations still imply that it is true, just like Newtonian mechanics did.)

1b) Strong Theological Determinism (a.k.a. Predestination)

Definition:
Strong theological determinism is the idea that the entire future of the universe, including the future choices of human beings, is causally determined by the eternal “will” or “plan” or “decree” of God.
Discussion:
Theists who hold to strong theological determinism may also hold to physical determinism as the means God uses to carry out his will, so these two subcategories of causal determinism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Or these theists may deny physical determinism and hold instead that God wills some events (such as human choices) to occur apart from any physical causation. Either way, the main idea is that God is the ultimate cause of every event, regardless of whether this ultimate causation is mediated or unmediated through physical causation.

The term predestination is usually used as a synonym for strong theological determinism, and it emphasizes the connotation that God’s will determines not only the course of the physical universe, but ultimately also the destiny of individual human beings after death. Some theological traditions use the word predestination in reference to a more general idea that God has a good purpose in mind for the future without actually having to causally determine every detail including the choices of human beings, however.

2) Logical Determinism (a.k.a. Determinateness)

Definition:
Logical determinism is the idea that the future of the universe is inevitable in the sense that there is an empirical fact of the matter as to what this future holds, even if there is not (or is not yet) a cause for all of the events comprising this future.
Discussion:
Logical determinism differs from causal determinism in that it accepts the possibility of uncaused or self-caused events in the future, yet it still sees a kind of necessity guaranteeing that these events will occur. As mentioned above, not everyone considers this idea a true species of determinism. This dispute also complicates the categorization of the various concepts of free will and the various theories about determinism and free will below.
Subcategories:

2a) Spatio-temporal Determinism (a.k.a. Eternalism or Block Universe)

Definition:
Spatio-temporal determinism is the idea that time is analogous to a spatial dimension, at least in the particular sense that the future is “real,” meaning it exists in some eternal fashion, so that there is a timeless fact of the matter as to what this future holds.
Discussion:
This is probably the view of most current scientists because it seems to be implied by Einstein’s theory of relativity, in that events that are considered simultaneous in one reference frame are considered non-simultaneous in another. (Although some hold that the equations of relativity can legitimately be interpreted in an admittedly non-intuitive way that does not actually require this view of time.)

2b) Weak Theological Determinism (a.k.a. Divine Foreknowledge)

Definition:
Weak theological determinism is the idea that the future is known by an omniscient God, so that future events will in fact inevitably occur in just the way God already knows they will occur.
Discussion:
Theists who hold to weak theological determinism may also hold to spatio-temporal determinism as the means by which a God outside of time can “foresee” and thus foreknow what will happen in the future, so these two subcategories of logical determinism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Or these theists may deny spatio-temporal determinism and hold instead that an omniscient God can still know the future even though that future and its causes do not yet exist (though many would argue that this is not a coherent theory, since it seems to postulate empirical facts with no truth-makers). Either way, the main idea is that even though human choices are held to be ultimately uncaused until they are made (by a “power of agency” generally attributed to a nonphysical Cartesian mind or soul), there is nevertheless a fact of the matter, known to God, about what someone will choose even before that person chooses or even exists.

Root Category: Free Will

Definition:
Free will is the ability to choose between various courses of action voluntarily, without being under any compulsion to choose one course of action over another.
Discussion:
This definition does not specify what would or would not count as a form of compulsion. It therefore includes a variety of concepts that can all be classified under the category of free will.
Subcategories:

1) Compatibilistic Freedom

Definition:
Compatibilistic freedom is the ability to choose between various courses of action in a way that is compatible with both logical and causal determinism. More specifically, compatibilistic freedom is usually taken to mean the ability to choose in accordance with one’s desires, so that by definition it involves no compulsion to choose a course of action that is not desired.
Discussion:
Compatibilistic freedom does not mean that a person is always fully conscious of the desires that control the process of choosing. Sometimes the process may feel more like a subjugation of desire in order to choose what is wise or right, for example. But if a person genuinely chooses to perform some action, rather than being physically compelled to perform that action (being physically pushed by someone else, for example), then the choice itself means that the person must have had something that can be called a desire to make that particular choice—a desire that subconsciously, at least, outweighed any contrary desire to choose differently at the time the choice was made.

2) Libertarian Freedom (a.k.a. Libertarian Free Will)

Definition:
Libertarian freedom is the ability to choose between various courses of action without the choice being inevitably necessitated (i.e., by determinism).
Discussion:
Since there are two general subcategories of determinism, this definition similarly calls for two subcategories of libertarian freedom in order to avoid ambiguity, although these two subcategories are not often clearly defined or specified by many writers, unfortunately. This is not too surprising, given that many do not consider logical determinism to be a true species of determinism, as already noted. Nevertheless, it is often difficult to know which kind of libertarian freedom many writers are really referring to when they use this term.
Subcategories:

2a) Weak Libertarian Freedom (nonstandard terminology)

Definition:
Weak libertarian freedom is the ability to choose between various courses of action without the choice being necessitated by causal determinism, even if the choice may be necessitated by logical determinism.
Discussion:
Weak libertarian freedom implies the ability to make choices that are uncaused until the time they are made (at which time they are generally held to be caused by a nonphysical “power of agency” belonging to the person). These choices are still logically necessitated, however, by there being an empirical fact of the matter (which an omniscient God would know, for example) as to how they will be made.

2b) Strong Libertarian Freedom (nonstandard terminology)

Definition:
Strong libertarian freedom is the ability to choose between various courses of action without the choice being necessitated in any way, either by causal or logical determinism.
Discussion:
Strong libertarian freedom implies the ability to make choices that are in principle unknowable (even by an omniscient God) until they are made. There is simply no fact of the matter to be known as to how they will be made.

Theories About Determinism and Free Will

Root Category: Compatibilism (a.k.a. Soft Determinism)

Definition:
Compatibilism is the theory that compatibilistic freedom is the only kind of free will needed in order for people to be morally accountable for their choices. In other words, it is the theory that human choices can be meaningfully free (in the sense required for people to be praiseworthy for their good choices and blameworthy for their bad choices) even if causal determinism is true.
Discussion:
Compatibilists do not necessarily hold that causal determinism is strictly true. Most would probably accept the idea that physical determinism, at least, seems unlikely, given the most natural interpretations of quantum mechanics. But compatibilists generally hold that the decision-making process of human beings is nevertheless largely deterministic in nature, much like a computer. They do not see quantum randomness or any other kind of indeterminism as playing a morally significant role in this process. In fact, they usually hold that compatibilistic freedom is the most morally meaningful kind of free will there could possibly be, because only in compatibilistic freedom are our choices fully determined by our desires, making us fully responsible for them. (In the compatibilist view, it is hard to see how a choice made on any other basis besides what a person truly desires could be morally meaningful at all.)

The question of whether a compatibilist believes in free will or not is ambiguous in contexts where the term free will is not clearly defined, because compatibilists believe in compatibilistic freedom but generally not in any kind of libertarian freedom.

Although the term soft determinism is in fairly common usage, I consider it somewhat confusing because it is not really a variety of determinism per se, but rather the theory that determinism does not contradict moral accountability. Both hard determinists and soft determinists may believe in exactly the same kind of determinism.

In Christian theology, compatibilism is usually associated with the doctrine of Calvinism.

Root Category: Incompatibilism

Definition:
Incompatibilism is the theory that libertarian freedom is needed in order for people to be morally accountable for their choices. In other words, human choices cannot be meaningfully free (in the sense required for people to be praiseworthy for their good choices and blameworthy for their bad choices) under the assumption of causal determinism.
Discussion:
Some would insist that an incompatibilist must hold that human choices cannot be meaningfully free even under the assumption of logical determinism, not just under the assumption of causal determination. This distinction will be dealt with only within the subcategory of libertarianism, since it is not really important within the subcategory of hard determinism.
Subcategories:

1) Hard Determinism

Definition:
Hard determinism is the theory that human choices are not meaningfully free (in the sense required for people to be praiseworthy for their good choices and blameworthy for their bad choices), because compatibilistic freedom is held to be insufficient for people to be morally accountable for their choices, but causal determinism is held to be true (at least in every aspect relevant to the human decision-making process).
Discussion:
Hard determinists consider moral accountability in the sense referred to above to be an illusion. This does not mean they are necessarily opposed to the concepts of praise and blame, or reward and punishment. It just means that praise and blame, or rewards and punishments, are never truly deserved in their view, though they might well still serve useful purposes, such as helping to deter future bad behavior and encourage future good behavior.

Although the term hard determinism is in fairly common usage, I consider it somewhat confusing because it is not really a variety of determinism per se, but rather the theory that determinism is true and contradicts moral accountability. As already noted, both hard determinists and soft determinists may believe in exactly the same kind of determinism.

In Christian theology, hard determinism is usually associated with the doctrine of hyper-Calvinism. (Although the line between Calvinism and hyper-Calvinism is not so clearly defined, and some people might sometimes be considered hyper-Calvinists even if they don’t deny moral accountability like hard determinists do.)

2) Libertarianism

Definition:
Libertarianism is the theory that libertarian freedom is needed in order for people to be morally accountable for their choices, and that people do in fact have libertarian freedom, because causal determinism is held to be false.
Discussion:
The dispute among libertarians over whether or not logical determinism counts as a species of determinism that must also be false in order for people to be morally accountable makes the term libertarianism rather ambiguous and therefore leads to the following subcategories, which are not often clearly distinguished, unfortunately.
Subcategories:

2a) Weak Libertarianism (nonstandard terminology)

Definition:
Weak libertarianism is the theory that weak libertarian freedom (but not strong libertarian freedom) is needed in order for people to be morally accountable for their choices, and that people do in fact have weak libertarian freedom, because causal determinism is held to be false (even though logical determinism may be true).
Discussion:
For weak libertarians, the important thing about free will is that our choices must not be causally determined before we make them. The possibility that they may be logically determined is not a problem in this theory.

In Christian theology, weak libertarianism is associated with the doctrine of Arminianism and with the doctrine of Molinism. (Molinism is also built on the concept of middle knowledge, which adds to the concept of weak theological determinism by postulating that not only is there a fact of the matter known to God about what a person will choose in the future, but also there is a fact of the matter known to God about what a person would choose in the future—still without being necessitated by causal determinism—if circumstances were to turn out differently from how they actually will turn out.)

2b) Strong Libertarianism (nonstandard terminology)

Definition:
Strong libertarianism is the theory that strong libertarian freedom is needed in order for people to be morally accountable for their choices, and that people do in fact have strong libertarian freedom, because causal and logical determinism are both held to be false.
Discussion:
For strong libertarians, the important thing about free will is that our choices must not be determined or necessitated in any way before we make them. There cannot be a fact of the matter about what a person will choose in the future, because if there were such a fact (knowable by an omniscient God, for example), then it would necessarily follow that the person will inevitably make that particular choice.

In Christian theology, strong libertarianism is associated with the doctrine of open theism.


This page copyright © 2016 Edward A. Morris.  Created January 21, 2016.  Last updated January 24, 2016.

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